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TIE LAW OF SLANDER AS APPLICABLE TO
PHYSICIANS.
TnERE is, perhaps, no class of professional men
more subject to
abuse, and, it is believed, more powerless to obtain redress
than
physicians. About clergymen, the law has thrown its
protecting
arm and public opinion has been wont to overlook, if not
to pardon
their short-comings. The clergyma n is a sort of privileged
person,
whoso character is tried before and whose conluct is regulated
by
eclesiatical tribunals to which the courts of law have relegated
it.
Lawver, can take care of themsoives.
For alleged professional misconduct, incapacity or ignorance,
for
rumored unskilful treatment of diseases, physicians who
choose
may have recourse to legal proceedings. But to cowhide
the editor
rt sue the newspaper for the circulation of a libel, may be
said in
either case to be social suicide. The physician must
grin and
bear it. But if he braves public opinion and asserts his
rights, if
he endeavors to obtain satisfaction at law, the chances are,
to say
the least uncertain. It is doubtful, as the law now stands,
what
charges of misconduct in a physician in a single instance
are actionable. One court (Camp v. M1artin, 23 Conn. 86) has
held that
words spoken of a physician, charging him merely with
ignorance
or misconduct in the treatment of a particular case were not
actionable. per se. The words were, "If Dr. C. had continued
to treat
her, she would have been in her grave befbre this time.
His treatment of her was rascally."
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Another court (Secor v. Harri', 18 Barb. 425) has adopted a
contrary view in a similar case, where the words were: "Dr. S.
killed my children. He gave them teaspoon doses of calomel: it
killed them; they died right off, the same day." This last is no doubt
a more aggravated case, but it is difficult to understand the grounds
upon which the principle was distinguished in the two cases. The
court said in the last instance that in the rendition of its judgment it
was borne out by the authorities, while in the first case, the court
was equally confident after having examined the authorities that
none could be found, analogous to the case at bar, to justify au
action for damages per se. Both, however, united on one case
(Sumner v. Utley, 7 Conn. 257), as being in point, and it is amusing to observe what different constructions the two opposing tribunals gave to a case which must certainly have decided one way or
the other. The Connecticut court said it thought that the case
referred to so far from-varying the rule as they had given it, intended to sanction it, and quoted at length from C. J. HOSMER, as
follows: "I readily admit that falsehood may be spoken of a physician's practice in a particular case, ascribing to him only such
want of information and good management as is compatible with general knowledge and skill in his profession, and that when such a
case arises, unless some special damage exists, his character will be
considered as unhurt and no damages will be presumed. But on
the other hand, it is indisputable that a calumnious report in a particular case may imply gross ignorance and unskilfalness, and do
him irreparable damage. A physician may mistake the symptoms
of a patient, or may misjudge as to the nature of his disease and even
as to the power of the medicine, and yet his error may be of that
pardonable kind that will do him no essential prejudice, because it
is rather a proof of human imperfection than of culpable ignorance
or unskilfulness. On the contrary, a single act of his, may evidence gross ignorance and such a deficiency of skill as will not fail
to injure his reputation and deprive him of general confidence."
Now the New York court on the other hand, said that the doctrine laid down in the cases of Poe v. Mondford, Cro. Eliz. 620,
and Foot v. Brown, 8 Johns. 64, both of which were adopted as
authorities by the Connecticut court, had been repudiated. In the
former, defendant charged plaintiff with having killed a patient
with physic, and it was held, that the words were not actionable
per 8e, and that the law only gave an action for words affecting a
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man's credit in his profession, as charging him with ignorance or
want of skill in general. In the latter the words were spoken of
an attorney: "F. knows nothing about the suit, he will lead you
on until he has undone you;" and it was held on the authority of
the former that no special damage being shown, the action would
not lie. Rejecting these two cases as unauthoritative. the New York
court also quoted from the case of Sumner v. Utley, supra, as
follows: "As a general principle it can never be admitted that the
practice of a physician in a particular case may be calumniated
with impunity unless special damage is shown. By confining the
slander to particulars, a man may thus be ruined in detail. A
calumniator might follow the track of the plaintiff and begin by
falsely ascribing to the physician the killing of three persons by
mismanagement, and then the mistaking of an artery for a vein,
and thus might proceed to misrepresent every single case of his
practice until his reputation should be blasted beyond remedy.
Instead of murdering character by one stroke, the victim would be
successively cut in pieces, and the only difference would be in the
manner of effecting the same result."
It is good to beat your adversary with his own weapons, and
while the case of Sumner v. Utley, decided in effect that slanderous words spoken of a physician were actionable per se, the court
in (amp v. Martin, supra, notwithstanding, drew a favorable conclusion for holding that in its case slanderous words were not actionable
per se. It is true that the case of Sumner v. Utley was somewhat
stronger than either of the other two, and may have furnished
grounds for the distinction that was drawn between gross ignorance
in a single instance, and gross ignorance generally in the treatment
of diseases, but there seems to us to be little, if any, difference
between a case where the words were that a doctor killed his
patient, and one where they alleged that if he had continued to
treat the patient she would have been dead by this time, so far as
the presumption of incapacity is concerned. In Sumner v. Utley
the words imputed gross ignorance generally and particulariy.
The defendant said of the physician: "He has killed three and
ought to be hung-damn him. They all died through his mismanagement. I have understood that he left an after-birth, and the
man that would do that ought to be hung;" and on another
occasion, addressing himself to Mrs. IT., who had employed plaintiff
as her physician, said: " ie was the means of her sickness by
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cutting an artery in her head-damn, him; you ought not to pay
him a cent; if Mr. H. had taken him up for it, it would have
cost him $400. Itought to be put in the newspapers." The rule
may be said to be as Chief Justice HoSMER put it, though it does
not appear to be very clear: "This then is the correct principle,
that the misrepresentation of a physcian's practice in a particular
case, if it does not warrant the presumption of damage is not
actionable, unless special damages are averred and proved; but if
from the nature of the calumny damages are inferable, the words
are actionable."
The question still remains, when do the misrepresentations of a

physician's practice in a particular case warrant the presumption
of damage? It is allowed -that slanderous words alleging gross
ignorance generally, or such ignorance or thorough incapacity as
unfits him for the proper exercise of his profession, are actionable
per 8e. To say of a physician that "He is a quack ;" (Pickford
v. Gutch, Dorchester Assizes, 1787); or "He is an empiric and a
mountebank ;" (Vin. Abr. Act. for Words, S. a. 12); or "He is a
quack; if he shows you a diploma it is a forgery ;" (Moises v.

Thornton, 8 Term Rep. 303) ;" or "He is no doctor; he bought
his diploma for $50 ;" (Bergold v. Puokta, 2 Thomp. & C. (N. Y.)
532); or " Heis a drunken fool and an ass and never was a scholar;"
(Cawdry v. Tetley, Godb. 441); or "He has killed six children in
one year :" (Carroll v. White, 33 Barb. 615) ; or "It is a world
of blood that he has to answer for in this town through his ignorance. He was the death of J. P. He killed his patient with
physic;" (Tutty v. Alewin, 11 Mod. 221); or "I wonder you had
him to attend you. Do you know him. He is not an apothecary;
he has not passed any examination. He is a bad character; none
of the medical men here will meet him. Several have died that
he has attended to, and there have been inquests held upon them ;"
(Southee v. Denny, 1 Ex. 196.) In all these cases it has been held
that damages are inferable without proof; but to say of a physician,
"He is so steady drunk that he cannot get business any more;"
(1 Ohio 83 n.); or "He is a two-penny bleeder ;" (Foster v. Small,
3 Whart. 138); or to charge an allopathic physician with having
met homceopathists in consultation, and that in the opinion of the
profession it was improper to do so and against etiquette, and
further, that in the opinion of the profession it was disgraceful to
meet a homceopathic in consultation (Clay v. Roberts, 8 L. T. N.
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S. 397); or to charge him with adultery not necessarily touching
him in his profession without showing that it was connected with
his profession (A~yre v. Craven, 2 Ad. & E. 2), have been held not
actionable per se.
While the authorities are generally agreed as to charges of gross
ignorance or incapacity in the exercise of the duties of the physician, it is not easy to determine what words are actionable in themselves in special instances. In analogous, and even in precisely
similar, cases, the courts are divided. Where the words were:
" He killed my child; it was the saline injection that did it ;" (Ed8all v. .Russell,4 M. & G. 1090); or, " He has killed my child by
giving it too much calomel," (Johnson v. Robertson, 8 Porter 486),
they have been held actionable per se. And, on the contrary, the
words, "He has killed his patient with physic," (Poe v. Mondford,
supra), or "In my opinion, the bitters A fixed for B, were the
cause of his death," (Jones v. Div'er, 22 Ind. 184), or "He gave my
child too much mercury, or he made the medicines wrong through
jealousy, because I would not allow him to use his own judgment,"
(Edsall v. Russell, supra), have been held not actionable in themselves.
In the examination of these cases, it will be found that where the
physician is charged with killing his patient, the words have been
held actionable on account of the imputation of crime which they
import, and the only case in which such language has been held nct
actionable, is that of Poe v. Afondford, of an early origin. This
case was rejected by the court in Seeor v. Barris,on the ground
that it was decided at a time when the doctrine of mitior sensus
prevailed. And as for the case of Jones v. Diver, the court held
that the words were not actionable, because they did not import a
charge of murder; that if the defendant had said that "the bitters
Dr. D. gave John Smith, caused his death; there was enough
poison in them to kill ten men," he would have been held guilty
of the charge, and the words would have then been actionable.
How such words necessarily import the crime of murder or manslaughter, in the absence of any expression of intention, is not
quite clear. This was not the ground of the decision in a case of a
non-professional, charged with having destroyed the life of a patient
by mistaken, but well-meant, efforts to save his life: March v. Da6.
vison, 9 Paige (N. Y.) 580.

But even if the words do not import

the charge of crime or of gross incapacity generally, there seems to

